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Comment 
LET THEM TRAIN:  WHY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S 
DECISION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION OF THE 2011 NFL 
LOCKOUT WAS INCORRECT 
AARON A. SPACONE 
Although the 2011 National Football League (“NFL”) lockout did not 
result in any cancelled regular season games, nor did it damage the 
players, stadium employees, and small business owners to the extent that it 
could have, there are still important lessons to be learned.  This Comment 
provides background on the NFL’s labor history, both in the court system 
and in the negotiation room.  Further, this Comment analyzes the 
application of American labor law to the then-pending NFL lockout.  This 
Comment concludes with the argument that the principles of labor law and 
public policy discussed herein should not have allowed the owners to lock 
out the players.  
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LET THEM TRAIN:  WHY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S 
DECISION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION OF THE 2011 NFL 
LOCKOUT WAS INCORRECT 
AARON A. SPACONE

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of the relationship between the National Football League 
(“NFL” or “League”) and its players has been a rocky one at best.  One 
reason for this tenuous relationship is the fact that the owners and players 
treat themselves as employers and employees, and that the courts have 
followed their lead.  Owners have players sign the same contracts with the 
same language as everyday people.  Yet, unlike the average American, 
NFL players are televised nationally every Sunday in the fall season.  
Another not-so-subtle difference between an NFL player and an average 
American is that the median NFL salary was $770,000 in 2011,
1
 while the 
median household income in the United States was $50,673 in December 
2011.
2
  Nevertheless, the same labor laws that govern the work life of the 
average American govern the work life of the average NFL athlete.  
It is with that understanding that this Comment, and the case of Brady 
v. National Football League,
3
 takes its shape.  The truth is that while 
professional football players may fall under the same general concept of 
jurisdiction and adjudication as the rest of us, there are nevertheless 
reasons why a labor issue between the players and their employers is 
unique.  When the NFL imposed a lockout of the players and jeopardized 
the 2011 season, it was not only the players, but also the coaches, trainers, 
television networks, stadium and concession workers, along with 
neighborhood bar and restaurant owners who faced the possibility of 
                                                                                                                          
 Villanova University, B.A. 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 
2013.  I would like to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for ideas, suggestions, and encouragement.  I 
would also like to thank the Connecticut Law Review for its hard work throughout the production 
process.  Most of all, I would like to thank my parents for their many years of love and support. 
1 The Average NFL Player, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 27, 2011, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214058615722.htm.  In fact, the average 
NFL salary is even higher at $1.9 million.  Id. 
2 GORDON GREEN & JOHN CODER, SENTIER RESEARCH, HOUSEHOLD INCOME TRENDS: JANUARY 
2012 2 (2012), available at http://www.sentierresearch.com/reports/Sentier_Research_Household_Inco
me_Trends_Report_January_2012_12_03_01.pdf. 
3 Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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serious revenue loss.
4
  The owners’ imposition of a lockout on the players, 
in an effort to maximize their already high revenue stream, showed a 
conscious disregard for the number of people who rely on the NFL season.   
The improper conduct of the owners, however, is not the subject of this 
Comment.  Instead, the discussion here will primarily focus on the four 
decisions made by federal courts on the legality of the lockout imposed by 
the League: two by the District Court for the District of Minnesota, and 
two by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
5
  The 
district court decisions favored the players, granting their request for a 
preliminary injunction of the lockout and denying the League’s motion for 
a stay pending appeal.  The Eighth Circuit decisions overturned the district 
court holdings and granted the stay pending appeal on the theory that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a lockout under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
6
 
This Comment will examine the history of the legal and football-
business-related issues between the League and the players to create a 
frame of reference for an analysis of why the Eighth Circuit’s decision was 
incorrect.  This Comment will be split into four parts: Part II will relate the 
history of labor relations between the NFL and its players; Part III will 
examine the most recent non-legal and football-related issues that led to 
the 2011 lockout; Part IV will discuss the federal courts’ involvement in 
standard labor issues over the years; and Part V will discuss how the 
Eighth Circuit erred in Brady.  
II.  A HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE NFL AND ITS PLAYERS  
Before analyzing the decisions made by the federal courts in Brady v. 
National Football League,
7
 it is necessary to obtain a fundamental 
understanding of the tenuous and complex history of labor relations 
between the NFL and its players.  This Part will lay the foundation for my 
discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, specifically with respect to why 
the NFL should not have been able to lock out the players after the players 
                                                                                                                          
4 See Lou Dubois, What an NFL Lockout Would Mean to Small Businesses, INC. (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.inc.com/articles/201103/what-an-nfl-lockout-would-mean-to-small-business.html (“[E]very 
city with an NFL franchise stands to lose about $160 million in revenue ($20 million per home game), 
$5 billion total, and an aggregate of 115,000 jobs.”).  The mayor of Buffalo, one of the League’s 
smallest markets, is also on record as saying that a season-long lockout would cost the city $140 
million.  Id. 
5 Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn.) [hereinafter Brady I]; Brady v. 
Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Minn. 2011) [hereinafter Brady II]; Brady v. Nat’l 
Football League, 640 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curium) [hereinafter Brady III]; Brady v. Nat’l 
Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Brady IV].  
6 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 792. 
7 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011). 
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decertified the union and decided to forfeit the protections of labor laws.   
The first case relevant to Brady was Mackey v. National Football 
League.
8
  In Mackey, the players challenged Commissioner Pete Rozelle’s 
restriction of player movement between NFL clubs, known as the “Rozelle 
Rule,” as a violation of the Sherman Act.9  The League claimed that the 
Rule was protected from antitrust regulation under the non-statutory labor 
exemption, which serves to “insulate legitimate collective activity by 
employees, which is inherently anticompetitive but is favored by federal 
labor policy.”10  In affirming the district court’s decision that the Rozelle 
Rule was a per se violation of antitrust laws,
11
 the Eighth Circuit used a 
three-part test to determine that the Rozelle Rule did not fall under the non-
statutory labor exemption and was thus vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny.
12
  
This victory for the players in Mackey did not last long, however, as the 
League ostensibly exchanged the Rozelle Rule for other provisions that 
could not be attacked in antitrust litigation.
13
 
The next major antitrust disputes to emerge between the League and 
the players came in the Powell/McNeil line of cases.
14
  Powell v. National 
Football League
15
 focused on veteran free agency, and specifically whether 
players have a right to bring suit under the Sherman Act at the point of a 
bargaining impasse.
16
  In Powell, the district court used the Mackey 
decision to determine that the League was open to a lawsuit at a bargaining 
impasse, but the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court’s rationale that a 
bargaining impasse triggered the application of the antitrust laws.
17
  
Instead, the Eighth Circuit held that, even though the collective bargaining 
agreement had expired and the parties were at impasse, management was 
                                                                                                                          
8 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
9 Id. at 609.  
10 Id. at 611. 
11 Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975). 
12 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (“We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy 
favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the 
restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.  Second, 
federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be 
exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.  Finally, the policy favoring collective 
bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement 
sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.” (citations omitted)). The 
district court in Brady II outlined the same test for exemption by quoting the Mackey opinion.  Brady 
II, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011).  The Eighth Circuit was satisfied with the first two 
prongs of the test, but found that the Rozelle Rule restricting free agency was not the product of the 
League’s bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.  Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615–16. 
13 See Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (discussing the “Plan B” restraints on players).  
14 Id. at 999. 
15 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). 
16 Id. at 1295–96. 
17 Id. at 1301. 
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protected from judicial intervention.
18
  On appeal, the court noted that 
labor policy favors negotiation and settlements, rather than judicial 
intervention, and it declined to limit the applicability of the labor 
exemption.
19
  While the ruling was unfavorable to the players, the Eighth 
Circuit did note the League’s concession that the Sherman Act could be 
applicable in certain situations, specifically “if the affected employees 
ceased to be represented by a certified union.”20 
It was in the Powell line of cases that the courts made their first 
explicit reference to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act 
is discussed further herein,
21
 but the district court used the Norris-
LaGuardia Act as a frame of reference for the non-statutory labor 
exemption in a separate Powell decision, holding—in line with the Eighth 
Circuit—that a bargaining impasse is not the equivalent of the end of a 
labor dispute, and thus does not preclude the Norris-LaGuardia Act from 
prohibiting an injunction in cases “involving or growing out of labor 
disputes.”22  In essence, the Norris-LaGuardia Act strips federal courts of 
the authority to enjoin labor disputes or disputes growing out of a labor 
relationship.  The Powell cases refused to set guidelines as to when there is 
no labor relationship, but they nonetheless illustrate that a mere bargaining 
impasse is not enough to preclude the application of the Act and to trigger 
the involvement of the federal courts.
23
 
Following the Mackey decision, the players chose to disclaim the union 
and bring suit against the League, alleging that a new system of player 
restraints (known as “Plan B” restraints) constituted an antitrust violation 
in another Powell v. National Football League decision.
24
  The League 
reasserted the non-statutory labor exemption, but the argument was 
rejected on summary judgment because, without a union, no “ongoing 
                                                                                                                          
18 See id. at 1302 (“Both relevant case law and the more persuasive commentators establish that 
labor law provides a comprehensive array of remedies to management and union, even after 
impasse. . . . We are influenced by those commentators who suggest that, given the array of remedies 
available to management and unions after impasse, a dispute such as the one before us ‘ought to be 
resolved free of intervention by the courts’ . . . .” (citing J. Weistart & C. Lowell, The Law of Sports  
§ 5.06, at 590 (1979))); see also id. (“A rule withdrawing immunity because the previous contract 
expired before a new agreement was reached is contrary to national labor law.  The parties would be 
forced to enter into a collective bargaining agreement to avoid antitrust sactions [sic], when labor law is 
opposed to any such requirement.” (quoting Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep Drive 
to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 774 
(1981))). 
19 Id. at 1303. 
20 Id. at 1303 n.12. 
21 See infra Part III.B. 
22 Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988). 
23 Id. at 815 (“[W]here the bargaining relationship and the collective bargaining process remains 
intact, a controversy regarding terms or conditions of employment constitutes a labor dispute.”). 
24 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1353–54 (D. Minn. 1991). 
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collective bargaining relationship” existed between the two parties.25  The 
League also claimed that for the union to be officially dissolved, the 
players would have to apply for and obtain decertification from the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).26  The court ruled, however, 
that as long as certification was not required for a union to participate in 
collective bargaining, decertification was not required to end collective 
bargaining.
27
  The court also recognized the limits of the requirement to 
bargain in good faith, establishing that the union no longer has such a duty 
when “a majority of the players have clearly indicated their wish not to be 
represented by any entity . . . during collective bargaining.”28 
Having satisfied the requirements for the dissolution of the union, the 
Powell plaintiffs successfully moved for partial summary judgment to 
strike the League’s claim that the non-statutory labor exemption still 
applied.
29
  The court granted partial summary judgment against the labor 
exemption defense, reasoning that the exemption no longer applied 
because no remedies existed under labor law with specific reference to 
collective bargaining, NLRB proceedings for failure to bargain in good 
faith, and strikes.
30
  The district court eventually ruled against the summary 
judgment motion in McNeil v. National Football League,
31
 a companion 
case of Powell.
32
  The court labeled the motion premature, but the case 
made it to a jury, where a verdict was returned that Plan B violated Section 
1 of the Sherman Act and caused economic injury to the players.
33
  The 
successful Powell judgment spurred a group of hopeful free agents to bring 
legal action against the League for the same restraints in Jackson v. 
National Football League.
34
  The court in Jackson based its holding on the 
decisions in both Powell and McNeil, granting a temporary restraining 
order because these individual players would suffer irreparable harm from 
the League’s restraints.35 
The decisions in McNeil and Jackson laid the groundwork for the 
antitrust class action litigation in White v. National Football League
36
 in 
                                                                                                                          
25 Id. at 1358. 
26 Id. at 1356. 
27 Id. at 1358. 
28 Id. at 1357–58 n.6. 
29 Id. at 1359. 
30 Id. 
31 790 F. Supp. 871, 897 (D. Minn. 1992).  
32 Judges and legal scholars often use McNeil to refer to the McNeil and Powell cases of 1991, 
both of which went in front of the District Court for the District of Minnesota. 
33 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1001–02 (D. Minn. 2011) (citing McNeil v. Nat’l Football 
League, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992) (publishing the special verdict form)). 
34 Id. at 1002 (citing Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D. Minn. 1992)). 
35 Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 230–31 (D. Minn. 1992). 
36 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993). 
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1993.
37
  In White, the players sought an injunction that would require total 
or modified free agency.
38
  After the court certified a settlement class, the 
League and the players entered into the White Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement (“SSA”), as well as a new collective bargaining agreement that 
mirrored the SSA.
39
  The most important compromise of the SSA was that 
the players were to recertify the union in exchange for the League agreeing 
to waive any future right to assert the non-statutory labor exemption.
40
  The 
end result of the White litigation was that the players reconstituted the 
National Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) as their 
bargaining authority, and entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
that mirrored the SSA.
41
   
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
42
 presented an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to establish jurisprudence on the divergence between labor 
and antitrust law.
43
  Having reached impasse in their negotiations with the 
players’ union over developmental squad player salaries, the owners 
decided to implement the terms of their “last best bargaining offer” without 
the approval of the union.
44
  The union filed an antitrust suit, but the 
Supreme Court held that this case fell under the “implicit antitrust 
exemption” that the Court has used in the past, which was designed to 
allow the collective-bargaining process to function properly.
45
  In its 
opinion, the Supreme Court discussed the reasoning behind such an 
exemption, better known as the “nonstatutory labor exemption,”46 noting 
that it has historical and logical roots.
47
   
Historically speaking, the non-statutory labor exemption was one way 
of keeping judges from using antitrust law to resolve labor disputes, which 
was deemed inappropriate.
48
  As decided in Local Union No. 189, 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. 
Jewel Tea Company,
49
 it is for Congress, not judges, to determine what 
                                                                                                                          
37 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (citing White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. 
Minn. 1993)); see infra Part III (providing a more thorough discussion of labor dispute injunctions and 
when they are appropriate).  
38 White, 822 F. Supp. at 1395.  
39 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 518 U.S. 231 (1996).   
43 See id. at 233 (“The question in this case arises at the intersection of the Nation’s labor and 
antitrust laws.”). 
44 Id. at 234. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 Id. at 236 (“This implicit exemption reflects both history and logic.”). 
48 Id.  
49 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
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constitutes reasonable practice in industrial conflicts.
50
  With respect to 
logic, the Court recognized the futility of a system of collective bargaining 
where negotiators are forbidden from signing contracts that restrict 
competition in any way.
51
  Thus, the only mechanism capable of 
effectuating federal labor laws, while at the same time establishing 
meaningful collective bargaining relationships between employers and 
employees, became a non-statutory labor exemption that shielded the 
parties from antitrust regulation.
52
 
The Court eventually held that the actions of the owners were still 
controlled by federal labor law, and by extension, the non-statutory labor 
exemption.  Despite reaching an impasse,
53
 the non-statutory labor 
exemption applied because the owners’ conduct: (a) immediately followed 
collective-bargaining negotiation; (b) grew out of and directly related to 
the bargaining process; (c) dealt with a matter reserved for collective 
bargaining; and (d) involved only the two parties to collective bargaining.
54
  
The Court’s decision to apply the non-statutory labor exemption is 
essentially its answer to the Powell decisions dealing with the duration of 
the non-statutory exemption and the significance of a bargaining impasse.
55
  
The Supreme Court made a similar ruling to that of the Eighth Circuit in 
Powell, holding that an impasse in labor negotiations did not always 
preclude antitrust intervention, notably in cases where an agreement among 
employers is “sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the 
collective-bargaining process.”56   
The situation that developed and ended with a lockout in March 2011 
began in 2008 when the NFL decided to opt out of the final two years of 
the SSA and Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), seeking a greater 
share of revenues and the ability to impose new restraints on player 
contracts.
57
  Attempts at structuring a deal in the years between 2008 and 
                                                                                                                          
50 See id. at 709 (“[T]his history shows a consistent congressional purpose to limit severely 
judicial intervention in collective bargaining under cover of the wide umbrella of the antitrust laws, 
and, rather, to deal with what Congress deemed to be specific abuses on the part of labor unions by 
specific proscriptions in the labor statutes.”). 
51 Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (“As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require 
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make 
among themselves or with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially 
necessary to make the process work or its results mutually acceptable.”). 
52 Id. 
53 The government argued through an amici curiae brief that the “exemption should terminate at 
the point of impasse.”  Id. at 244.  Termination of the exemption would allow the union to bring an 
antitrust suit. 
54 Id. at 250. 
55 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (D. Minn. 2011). 
56 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
57 See Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (noting that the NFL wanted to impose restraints on the 
“rookie wage scale”). 
 1026 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1017 
2011 proved fruitless, and the NFL threatened to impose a lockout.
58
  By 
the time the SSA and CBA were to expire on March 11, 2011, the players 
had determined that it was in their best interest to decertify their union so 
that the League presumably could not impose on them anticompetitive 
restrictions free from antitrust scrutiny.
59
 
The decertification of the players’ union brings us to the litigation that 
will be thoroughly discussed in this Comment.  Known as the “Brady 
Plaintiffs,” a group of NFL players immediately filed a complaint alleging 
antitrust violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, along with breach 
of contract and tort claims.
60
  Relief was requested in the form of a 
preliminary injunction that would enjoin all thirty-two teams from 
perpetuating the lockout.
61
  The essence of the players’ claim was that the 
teams (which are separately-owned and independently-operated) conspired 
through a “price-fixing arrangement or a unilaterally-imposed set of 
anticompetitive restrictions on player movement, free agency, and 
competitive market freedom—to coerce the [p]layers to agree to a new 
anticompetitive system of player restraints that will economically harm the 
Plaintiffs.”62   
Because the standard for a preliminary injunction is whether the 
absence of an injunction is “likely” to lead to irreparable harm,63 the 
burden was on the players to show that allowing the lockout to stand would 
likely result in irreparable injury to them.  The plaintiffs presented the 
court with affidavits supporting this irreparable harm, focusing mainly on 
the relatively short careers of NFL players, in an effort to prove that 
damages would be an insufficient remedy.
64
  The players argued that 
because of the pressure they face every day to prove themselves physically 
and economically, the loss of an entire year in such a short professional 
career could never be regained, and thus could not be compensated in 
damages, as players’ careers could easily be shortened or end as a result of 
                                                                                                                          
58 Id. (defining a lockout as when an employer lays off its unionized employees while undergoing 
a labor dispute to enhance its bargaining position (citing Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 
301–02 (1965))). 
59 Id.  The players’ union, the NFLPA, informed the NFL the next day that they claimed no 
interest in representing the players in negotiations.  Id.   
60 Id. at 1004. 
61 Id.  The players also used the term “group boycott” to describe the situation.  Id. 
62 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also noted that the aim of the lockout was to 
shut down the entire free agent market.  Id.  
63 See Winter v. Natura Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (holding that the possibility 
standard of there being irreparable harm is too lenient, and that the standard should be one where 
irreparable injury is likely (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983))). 
64 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (noting that it would be difficult to assess the amount of 
damages players deserved due to their unique skill-sets and because there was no competitive market to 
use as a guide).  The court also discussed the affidavits in more detail, and it noted how many of them 
calculated the typical career of an NFL player to be less than four years, due to “the ever-present risk of 
career-ending injury and the constant physical wear and tear on players’ bodies.”  Id. 
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the loss of a full season.
65
 
Before discussing the legal issues in depth, the district court in Brady I 
acknowledged the low standard that has been applied in the past with 
respect to the likelihood of irreparable harm.  In 2008, the district court 
held that lost playing time constituted irreparable harm.
66
  In Powell, the 
district court also held that NFL restrictions produced irreparable injury.
67
  
Using language adopted by the attorneys in the case at bar, the district 
court held that “[t]he existence of irreparable injury is underscored by the 
undisputed brevity and precariousness of the players’ careers in 
professional sports, particularly in the NFL.”68  It was with those affidavits 
and arguments in hand that the district court heard oral arguments on the 
motion for a preliminary injunction.
69
 
III.  A DISCUSSION OF THE NON-LEGAL ISSUES OUT OF  
WHICH THE 2011 LOCKOUT AROSE  
This Part will discuss the non-legal issues that produced the tension 
between the NFL and the players, leading to the March 2011 lockout.  The 
state of dissatisfaction amongst the owners began with the signing of a new 
CBA in 2006.  Paul Tagliabue, who was on his way out as NFL 
commissioner at the time, lobbied ownership to accept the deal in an effort 
to keep his legacy of labor peace intact.
70
  The deal eventually agreed to by 
the owners
71
 contained a revenue-sharing provision that directed the 
                                                                                                                          
65 Id.  
66 Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 598 F. Supp. 2d 971, 982–83 (D. 
Minn. 2008) (extending a preliminary injunction issued as a temporary restraining order against arbitral 
awards that upheld four-game suspensions for the use of banned substances in part because the players 
were subject to irreparable harm). 
67 Powell, 690 F. Supp. at 818 (refusing to impose injunctive relief for the unrestricted free 
agency rules, but conceding that “at least some of the players are likely to sustain irreparable harm if 
they are not immediately permitted to sign with other NFL clubs”). 
68 Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 231 (citing Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 
1319 (D. Conn. 1977) (“[T]he career of a professional athlete is more limited than that of persons 
engaged in almost any other occupation.  Consequently the loss of even one year of playing time is 
very detrimental.”)). 
69 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. 
70 See Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent, Fumbling Away the Season: Will the Expiration of 
the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of the 2011 Season?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1419, 1428 (2010) (suggesting that Commissioner Tagliabue did not want his legacy tarnished 
by retiring at a time of labor unrest); see also Michael Silver, Fans’ Guide to NFL Labor Battle, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ms-laborquestions090810 
(detailing the involvement of Gene Upshaw, the NFLPA’s late executive director, who may have used 
Tagliabue’s fear of leaving a tarnished legacy as leverage to get the players an even better share of the 
revenue).  
71 The deal was signed by thirty of thirty-two owners, with the owners of the Buffalo Bills and 
Cincinnati Bengals dissenting.  Jarrett Bell, NFL Owners Accept Player Union Proposal with 30-2 
Vote, USA TODAY (Mar. 8, 2006, 4:43 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2006-
03-08-labor_x.htm. 
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League’s top fifteen revenue producers to contribute to a fund to be 
dispersed to the lower-revenue teams.
72
  The agreement also placed another 
$850 million to $900 million of the owners’ money into the player revenue 
pool, which was to run on a sliding scale based on the top fifteen teams in 
non-television and ticket income.
73
  Based on that information alone, it is 
clear why the 2011 lockout not only occurred, but why it was virtually 
inevitable.  This agreement was a dream scenario for the players, as it also 
raised the salary cap from $85.5 million to $102 million, leaving more 
money available for veterans and free agents.
74
   
The question as to why a majority of the owners voted for this deal 
was often asked during the negotiations phase and after the deal was 
signed.
75
  Despite large amounts of money changing hands from the NFL’s 
richest owners and moving down the line, this system of profit-sharing was 
still seen as a better option than the possibility of an uncapped 2007 season 
and a work stoppage in 2008.
76
  Perhaps the other owners should have 
listened to Buffalo Bills owner Ralph Wilson, who “questioned whether 
management acted too hastily without carefully deliberating its future 
economic consequences.”77  In total, thirty owners signed a deal that gave 
59.6% of total revenue to players’ salaries.78  On top of that, the new CBA 
failed to address other areas of concern for the NFL, including the high 
salaries for star players and veterans, and especially the escalating rookie 
salary structure.
79
  With the new CBA not only failing to address these 
areas of concern, but also actually allocating even more revenue for player 
salaries,
80
 it is easy to see how the NFL became restless and discontented 
with the agreement in the following years. 
                                                                                                                          
72 See id. (noting that the League’s top five teams would place the most money in the fund).  The 
seventeen lowest-revenue teams would not only not have to contribute to the player revenue pool, but 
would also receive funds from the top fifteen earners, and yet two low-revenue teams (the Bills and the 
Bengals) still voted against the deal.  Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Levine & Maravent, supra note 70, at 1429.  Wilson stated, “I didn’t understand [the revenue 
sharing sections of the 2006 CBA] . . . it is a very complicated issue and I didn’t believe we should 
[have] rush[ed] to vote in [forty-five] minutes.”  Id. (alterations in original) (citing NFL Owners 
Approve Six-Year CBA Extension, ESPN.COM (Mar. 8, 2006), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2360258). 
78 Silver, supra note 70. 
79 Levine & Maravent, supra note 70, at 1428. 
80 Id. 
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IV.  THE INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERAL COURTS 
A.  Procedural History 
Before the dispute was settled out of court by a mediator, four 
decisions were handed down by federal court judges—two by the District 
Court for the District of Minnesota and two by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
81
  On April 25, 2011, the district court 
granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that: (1) the 
district court would not refer the issue of whether the players’ union 
disclaimer was valid to the NLRB; (2) the disclaimer of the union was 
effective; (3) the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply and thus the district 
court was not precluded from issuing an injunction; (4) the players had 
demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm if no injunction were issued; 
(5) the players had a fair chance of succeeding on the merits of their claim; 
and (6) public interest supported granting the motion for a preliminary 
injunction.
82
  For the purposes of this Comment, I will focus on the 
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as well as the public policy 
concerns of both the district court and the Eighth Circuit.  
Courts should pay “particular regard to the public consequences” in 
employing the “extraordinary remedy” of preliminary injunction.83  Indeed, 
the district court took that sentiment to heart in its opinion, determining 
that policies of collective bargaining give way to antitrust policies that 
favor competition as long as the decertification of the union is valid.
84
  
When the court discussed the impact being felt by non-parties to the suit, it 
was speaking of parties who feel a “tangible economic impact,” from 
broadcasters down to individuals who run concession stands.
85
  The court 
also noted a concededly non-economic “intangible interest” felt by fans of 
professional football who have a “strong investment” in a season.86 
On April 27, 2011, the same judge denied the defendant owners’ 
motion for a stay of the injunction, holding that: (1) the balance of equities 
                                                                                                                          
81 See supra note 5.  The first case that came before the courts arose before the district court.  As 
discussed previously, the players sought a preliminary injunction on the League-imposed lockout.  See 
supra Part I.   
82 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1042 (D. Minn. 2011). 
83 Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). 
84 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1041–42 (“[T]he public has an interest in the enforcement of the 
Sherman Act, which, by seeking to ensure healthy competition in the market, has a broad impact 
beyond the immediate parties to this dispute.”). 
85 Id. at 1042. 
86 Id. (recognizing that the presence of these third parties makes this dispute “far from a purely 
private dispute over compensation”); see also Dubois, supra note 4 (discussing the short and long-term 
effects an NFL lockout would have on small business owners, including a real possibility that 
cancellation of the season would deliver “the final knockout punch” resulting in complete business 
shutdowns). 
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weighed against the owners; (2) the owners had not made a sufficient 
showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits; and (3) the public 
interest in considering the ramifications of a lost football season weighed 
in favor of denying the motion.
87
 
The NFL appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, where on May 2, 2011, a divided 2-1 bench reversed the 
district court’s decision and granted the motion for a stay of the 
injunction.
88
  By per curiam opinion, the court reasoned that the NFL had 
made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its 
claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the lockout under 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act
89
 and the NFL had met its burden to prove that it 
would suffer some degree of irreparable harm absent a stay.
90
 
On June 3, 2011, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals submitted the 
official opinion that vacated the injunction entirely and remanded the case 
to the district court.
91
  Unlike the previous opinion of the same court that 
was submitted per curiam, this decision was written by Judge Steven 
Colloton.
92
  However, it remained a 2-1 decision, with Judge Kermit Bye 
writing a lengthy dissent.
93
  In his opinion, Judge Colloton narrowed his 
focus to the Norris-LaGuardia Act itself and its application to the case at 
bar.  Judge Colloton’s opinion for the court held that: (1) the definition of a 
labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia’s anti-injunction provision did not 
require the existence of a union;
94
 (2) the district court did not have the 
authority to enjoin a party to a labor dispute from implementing a 
lockout;
95
 and (3) the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not foreclose an injunction 
against the League’s dealings with non-employees (free agents, rookies, 
etc.), but that an injunction in that case would have to conform with the 
Norris-LaGuardia sections calling for open-court hearings that allow for 
cross-examination of witnesses.
96
 
B.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act 
Before the federal courts’ involvement in the Brady litigation can be 
properly analyzed, it is necessary to relate the background and history of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.  Described as an anti-injunction statute, the 
                                                                                                                          
87 Brady II, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053–54 (D. Minn. 2011). 
88 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 794. 
89 Id. at 792. 
90 Id. at 794. 
91 Brady IV, 644 F.3d at 682. 
92 Id. at 663. 
93 Id. at 682. 
94 Id. at 669–74. 
95 Id. at 680–81. 
96 Id. at 681–82. 
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Norris-LaGuardia Act passed through Congress in 1932,
97
 signaling a 
changing dynamic in labor law.
98
  The historical stage for the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was set by the legal challenges to the Clayton Act, most 
notably in the case of Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering.
99
  The 
Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, was designed to prevent the federal courts 
from using the Sherman Act against organized labor.
100
  Duplex arose 
when “unionized machinists organized a strike and boycott against a 
company that refused to recognize the union.”101  The issue in this case was 
the legality of secondary boycotts.
102
  The majority refused to make a claim 
on absolute rights, and instead ruled against the workers because the 
boycott was “sentimental or sympathetic” rather than “proximate and 
substantial.”103  The Justices simply did not find a connection between 
working conditions at the company that was being boycotted and the 
interests of the boycotting workers employed by competing firms in the 
business.
104
  The ruling against workers was yet another example of judges 
striking down efforts by organized labor to strengthen workers’ bargaining 
positions by labeling them “malicious.”105  
It is out of this historical context, one where judges looked to enjoin 
the activities of organized labor, that Norris-LaGuardia emerged.  The two 
principal goals of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were to curtail yellow-dog 
contracts and injunctions designed to strike down organized labor 
practices.
106
  Despite the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act stripped 
federal courts of authority that they had possessed since the formation of 
                                                                                                                          
97 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
98 See GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS 161 (2003) (discussing how the Norris-
LaGuardia Act came out of a difficult era for labor organizations). 
99 254 U.S. 443 (1921). 
100 Id. at 465. 
101 LOVELL, supra note 98, at 59. 
102 See Duplex, 254 U.S. at 466 (defining a secondary boycott as “a combination not merely to 
refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by peaceful means persuade complainant’s 
customers to refrain (‘primary boycott’), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual 
or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage”). 
103 Id. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LOVELL, supra note 98, at 59. 
104 LOVELL, supra note 98, at 59. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 161.  Yellow-dog contracts, or those contracts that prohibit employees from becoming a 
member of a labor union, are strictly prohibited under Norris LaGuardia, and subsequently under the 
laws of every state.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 380-3 (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-3 
(West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:12-2 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-2-4 (West 2011); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.32.030 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.52 (West 2011).  Case law for the 
better part of the early twentieth century came out against labor organizations and workers on the issue 
of yellow-dog contracts, as courts were reluctant to side against big businesses.  See Hitchman Coal & 
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (making yellow-dog contracts more of a tool for employers 
to resist unions); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a state law provision similar to 
the one in Adair v. United States); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (rejecting the idea that 
the legislature could make law to protect labor organizations). 
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the judicial system, there were very few constitutional challenges
107
 and, 
even more surprisingly, judges were quick to uphold the limits placed on 
their jurisdiction.
108
 
The section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act most relevant to this 
comment is the section that places limits on the ability of a court to issue 
an injunction.  Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states: “No court of 
the United States shall have the jurisdiction to issue a temporary or 
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor 
dispute” until a certain set of procedural and substantive restrictions are 
met.
109
    
What is most important about the Norris-LaGuardia Act is that it was 
Congress’s response to years of big business abuse of labor organizations 
and judicial complicity in that abuse.  When Congress makes it difficult to 
enjoin labor disputes, the petitioners asking for injunction are almost 
always the employers who want their employees to stop striking and 
boycotting their businesses.  That understanding speaks directly to 
congressional intent, as it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended 
for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to deal with cases where employees have 
stopped working and have either gone on strike or staged an actual boycott, 
and that the party asking for an injunction would be the actual target of the 
strike.  What Congress was worried about in drafting the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act was violence and damage to property, and the party asking for an 
injunction in those cases was almost always the target of the strike or 
boycott.  Norris-LaGuardia did not leave a loophole for violent strikes, but 
in such cases, the complainants had an established five-part test to pass to 
determine whether or not an injunction was absolutely necessary.
110
 
For “Norris-LaGuardia to succeed where the Clayton Act had failed, 
the courts had to do more than adopt a broader interpretation of what 
activities were immunized. . . . [T]he courts also had to find that the 
                                                                                                                          
107 See LOVELL, supra note 98, at 171–72 (stating that there were very few constitutional 
challenges to the yellow-dog contract language and that the constitutional challenges to the jurisdiction 
of the courts failed).   
108 Id. at 172 (“Even justices who were openly hostile to labor quickly dismissed constitutional 
challenges to Congress’s power to place limits on court jurisdiction.”); see also id. (citing lower level 
cases such as Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, et al., 7 F. Supp. 322, (E.D. Ill. 1934), Cinderella 
Theater Co., Inc. v. Sign Writers’ Local Union No. 591, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1934), and 
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1934), as well as Supreme Court cases Senn 
v. Tile Layers Protective Unions, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) and Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 301 U.S. 315 
(1938)). 
109 Id. at 179 (noting that an injunction may not be issued until a judge has held an open, 
adversarial hearing to make the necessary findings of fact). 
110 Id. at 181 (discussing the idea that injunctions in labor disputes were not impossible, especially 
in cases where violence had occurred, but that judges still had to go through the finding of fact process 
to make such a determination); see also id. (citing Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 315 (1938) (reprimanding 
a lower court for failing to make the necessitated findings of fact in a case where violence grew out of a 
labor dispute).  
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immunities covered a much broader range of persons.”111  Essentially, 
judicial attitudes needed to change before Norris-LaGuardia could be a 
success.  To put it bluntly, judges needed to take a hands-off approach to 
labor disputes in order to accomplish the purpose of Norris-LaGuardia.  
Further, “[t]he Norris-LaGuardia provisions were more successful than the 
corresponding provisions in the Clayton Act in part because judges often 
ruled that Norris-LaGuardia’s immunities applied to a broader range of 
persons.”112 
A clear example of this shift in favor of a hands-off approach to labor 
disputes is the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.
113
  In Senn, a 
tiling contractor requested an injunction to prevent a union of tile layers 
from picketing outside his business.
114
  The objective of the picketing was 
to force Senn to become a union contractor and to enter into an agreement 
under which he was to hire union men.
115
  When Senn refused to sign the 
agreement, the union
116
 peacefully and lawfully picketed his place of 
business.
117
  The situation at bar was similar to the one in Duplex Printing 
v. Deering,
118
 where the picketers were not seeking employment with the 
company they were targeting.  However, while the Court in Duplex issued 
an injunction, the Court in Senn ruled that the lower court could not issue 
an injunction.
119
  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Senn reflected a 
newfound laissez-faire mentality with regard to shared interests among 
workers at different firms who happen to be involved in the same 
industry.
120
 
The outcome in Senn shows that we owe much of the success of 
Norris-LaGuardia to the differences in language between this Act and the 
Clayton Act, especially with respect to who is and who is not protected.  
Section 20 of the Clayton Act lacked clear references to who was and who 
was not protected, while the Norris-LaGuardia Act has a section devoted to 
defining cases that “grow[] out of a labor dispute.”121  Section 13 of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act defines such cases as those involving “persons who 
are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct 
or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; 
                                                                                                                          
111 Id. at 200. 
112 Id. 
113 301 U.S. 468 (1937). 
114 Id. at 473. 
115 Id. at 474. 
116 It is important to recognize that the union members picketing Senn’s business were not 
employed by Senn nor were they seeking any employment at his business.  LOVELL, supra note 98, at 
201. 
117 Senn, 301 U.S. at 474–75. 
118 254 U.S. 443 (1921). 
119 LOVELL, supra note 98, at 201. 
120 Id. 
121 Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers 
or employees.”122  This language as to who or what is involved in “a labor 
dispute” seems to encompass just about every possibility conceivable by 
the drafters.  The success of Norris-LaGuardia is due to this all-
encompassing language, as judges could now overturn weak case law 
without controversy.  
The Supreme Court went even further in crafting a working definition 
for the term “labor dispute” in deciding the case of New Negro Alliance v. 
Sanitary Grocery Company.
123
  In New Negro Alliance, the petitioners 
were an organization composed of African-Americans that sought 
workplace improvements for its members as well as “the promotion of 
civic, educational, benevolent, and charitable enterprises.”124  The 
respondent in the case was a corporation operating 255 grocery stores and 
employing members of both races.
125
  There was no employer-employee 
relationship between the parties.
126
  As in Senn, the protesters also had no 
interest in being employed by the respondent or by any other grocery 
store.
127
  In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts wrote: “We think the 
conclusion that the dispute was not a labor dispute within the meaning of 
the Act, because it did not involve terms and conditions of employment in 
the sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working 
conditions is erroneous.”128   
Because there was no direct employer-employee relationship between 
the two parties, the Court applied other, lesser-known portions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act to establish that the case grew out of a labor dispute.  
Justice Roberts followed the language of Section 13 to draw this 
conclusion, specifically that a labor dispute need not require a dispute 
between employers and employees.
129
  Justice Roberts quoted subsections 
(a) and (b),
130
 but it is the language of subsection (c) that is most notable.  
Justice Roberts wrote that a labor dispute includes “‘any controversy 
concerning terms or conditions of employment, . . . regardless of whether 
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and 
employee.’”131 
                                                                                                                          
122 LOVELL, supra note 98, at 201. 
123 303 U.S. 552 (1938). 
124 Id. at 555. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 See id. (discussing the fact that the petitioners were not competitors working in the same line 
of business as the respondent); see also LOVELL, supra note 98, at 201 n.60 (“This time, the ruling 
came even though none of the protesters were employed or interested in being employed at the store or 
at any other grocery store.”). 
128 New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 559–60. 
129 Id. at 560–61. 
130 Id. at 560.  
131 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1934)). 
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V.  WHY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG  
As the Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied the framework established in 
Part I of this Comment
132
 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
133
 the court in 
Brady was incorrect in holding that the owners’ lockout of the players 
could not be enjoined.  The Eighth Circuit’s decision was incorrect for the 
following reasons: (1) the NFL was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its 
claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act to enjoin the lockout; (2) the NFL had not met its burden to 
demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; and (3) 
public policy favored the players’ position as to whether or not an 
injunction should have been issued. 
When analyzing whether or not a stay should be issued, a circuit court 
of appeals is attempting to decide whether or not it should intrude on the 
decision made by a district court—in this case, the issuance of an 
injunction.
134
  A stay is defined as “an intrusion into the ordinary processes 
of administration and judicial review, . . . and accordingly is not a matter of 
right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant.”135  
A.  The NFL Was Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits of Its Claim That the 
District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
The NFL was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that a 
federal court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a lockout in large part due to the 
principal purpose behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act.  As was previously 
discussed, the rationale behind the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
was to protect labor organizations, which had very little protection, from 
exposure to the injunction power of the federal courts.
136
  Judge Bye made 
reference to the Duplex case in his dissent, noting that “the Court refused 
to extend a similar anti-injunction provision in the Clayton Act to 
secondary activity—i.e., activity where union pressure is directed against 
third parties rather than the employees’ own employer.”137  However, the 
language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is broad and more encompassing for 
a reason, and that reason was so that more labor activities could be 
shielded from federal court involvement.
138
 
                                                                                                                          
132 See supra Part I. 
133 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also supra Part IV.B. 
134 See supra Part IV.A. 
135 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 794 (Bye, J., dissenting) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 
(2009)). 
136 See supra Part III.B. 
137 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 797 (Bye, J., dissenting) (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of 
Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 438 (1987)). 
138 See supra notes 113–28 and accompanying text (discussing how the Senn and New Negro 
Alliance cases applied the Norris LaGuardia Act to a larger class of citizens and activities). 
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When analyzing congressional intent in the enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, Judge Bye noted that “Congress took care to greatly 
broaden . . . the meaning . . . attributed to the words labor dispute,”139 and 
that Congress emphasized “the public importance under modern economic 
conditions of protecting the rights of employees to organize into unions 
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”140  The case law under the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act strongly supports the proposition that the intent of 
the Act’s drafters was to protect workers and those who were picketing in 
support of workers’ interests,141 and not to protect big business employers 
from locking out their employees. 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted to protect the collective 
bargaining process.
142
  It is with that understanding that we revisit the 
discussion of the early cases involving the NFL and its players.  Judge Bye 
cited to the Powell case, recognizing that “[u]nless the values of collective 
bargaining are implicated, federal labor laws yield to the regular antitrust 
framework.”143  In Powell, the Eighth Circuit declined to set the limits on 
what qualifies as “involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” but the 
Court did hold that a bargaining impasse was not enough to preclude the 
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
144
  As long as there is ongoing 
collective bargaining, courts have been reluctant to deny the applicability 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
145
   
The situation at bar in Brady, however, is inapposite to cases such as 
Powell.  The players (read: employees) disclaimed the role of the NFLPA 
as their representative in any collective bargaining.
146
  The players 
decertified the union in a vote to end its status as their legal 
                                                                                                                          
139 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 797 (Bye, J., dissenting)  (alterations in original) (quoting Allen Bradley 
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 805 (1945)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
140 Id.; see also Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 703 n.4 (1965) (“[T]o 
protect the rights of labor . . . .”).  
141 See, e.g., Senn, 301 U.S. at 470 (protecting the right to picket even though the picketers were 
not seeking employment with that business); see also New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 560 (citing 
subsection (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, defining the term “labor dispute” as including “any 
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, . . . regardless of whether or not the 
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee” (alteration in original) (quoting 
29 U.S.C. § 113 (1934))). 
142 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 798 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law remains focused on safeguarding 
the collective bargaining process.”). 
143 Id. (citing Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303). 
144 See Powell, 690 F. Supp. at 815 (“[W]here the bargaining relationship and the collective 
bargaining process remains intact, a controversy regarding terms or conditions of employment 
constitutes a labor dispute.”).  
145 See id. (“The current controversy surrounding the free agency issue constitutes a ‘labor 
dispute’ as contemplated by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”).   
146 See supra Part II. 
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representative.
147
  This action taken by the players is perhaps the most 
significant action taken in the entire litigation, as their vote to strip the 
union of its power to represent them in their capacity as employees brings 
collective bargaining to a definitive halt.
148
  Decertification of the union 
ends the collective bargaining process because the union is no longer the 
representative of the players, and also triggers the opportunity to bring 
antitrust litigation under the Sherman Act.
149
   
Judge Bye found the solution to this issue in the Brown litigation, most 
notably in the Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
150
  In 
Brown, although the Court was dealing with the nonstatutory labor 
exemption, and although the Court came out on the side of the employer,
151
 
there is much to be learned from the opinion.  The Court in Brown 
discussed the existence of “an agreement among employers [that] could be 
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not 
significantly interfere with that process.”152  The Court then cited examples 
of “sufficiently distant” events, one of which being a “collapse of the 
collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the 
union.”153  Judge Bye understood the situation as one where the players 
have no association to a union, and have thus chosen to pursue their 
interests under the antitrust law instead of remaining under the protection 
of labor law.
154
  Because the players do not fall under the framework of 
American labor law, the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not have been 
triggered, thus allowing an injunction to be issued against the lockout in 
this case. 
In assessing the application of Norris-LaGuardia to the case at bar, 
Judge Bye distinguished between the majority’s use of the New Negro 
Alliance case and the proper reading of the case.
155
  The majority of the 
Eighth Circuit (Judges Colloton and Benton), incorrectly cited New Negro 
                                                                                                                          
147 Id. 
148 Phillip Lawrence Wright, Jr., Major League Soccer: Antitrust, the Single Entity, and the 
Heightened Demand for a Labor Movement in the New Professional Soccer League, 10 SETON HALL J. 
SPORT L. 357, 386 (2000). 
149 Id. 
150 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
151 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 798 (Bye, J., dissenting).  
152 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
153 Id.  Ostensibly, employees can avoid the application of labor laws that preclude federal court 
involvement by decertifying the union that represented them.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 
1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (“If employees wish to seek the protections of 
the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.”); see also Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 
1995) (recognizing that the players can avoid a labor injunction if they disclaim the players’ union as a 
collective bargaining agent). 
154 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 799 (Bye, J., dissenting) (citing Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057). 
155 New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 552.  
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Alliance to stay the injunction under the proposition that there need not be 
a labor union for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to apply.
156
  Further, the 
majority held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act embraces controversies 
whether they are between employers and employees, labor unions 
representing employees and employers, or even persons seeking 
employment and employers.
157
  While New Negro Alliance certainly 
provides support for a broad reading of “labor dispute,” the problem with 
the application of its holding to this case is that it did not address the 
question as to whether or not the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies after the 
decertification of a union.
158
 
In New Negro Alliance, the Court made a determination that, even 
though the picketers were not asserting economic interests that most often 
are implicated in labor disputes, such as working conditions, wages, or 
hours, the controversy arose out of a labor dispute, thus triggering the 
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
159
  It is, in fact, immaterial that 
the primary concern was not economic, but instead political or social in 
nature, and Norris-LaGuardia should have thus applied to preclude federal 
court involvement.
160
   
The Court in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshore 
Men’s Association161 went even further, discussing the intent behind the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, laying the groundwork for Judge Bye’s argument.  
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, an affiliate 
of the International Longshoremen’s Association refused to load three 
ships bound for the Soviet Union with superphosphoric acid.
162
  The 
employer sought an injunction under the argument that Norris-LaGuardia 
only protects labor disputes, that labor disputes only exist when a union 
acts in economic self-interest, and that in this case the primary motivation 
was political, rather than economic.
163
  The Court, however, reiterated that 
the critical test of Norris-LaGuardia application is whether or not “the 
employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy.”164  
                                                                                                                          
156 See Brady III, 640 F.3d at 791 (recognizing that no labor union was involved in New Negro 
Alliance); see also id. (“[T]he Act plainly embrace[s] the controversy which gave rise to the instant suit 
and classif[ies] it as one arising out of a dispute defined as a labor dispute.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
157 See id. (citing New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 560–61).  
158 Id. at 799 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
159 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshore Men’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 714 (1982). 
160 Id. at 714–15 (“The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the 
dispute.” (quoting New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 561)). 
161 457 U.S. 702 (1982). 
162 Id. at 704–05 (notably, superphosphoric acid was not included in President Carter’s embargo 
restricting certain trade with the Soviet Union). 
163 Id. at 713. 
164 Id. at 712–13 (alteration in original) (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 
U.S. 143, 147 (1942)). 
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Further, the Court cited New Negro Alliance for the proposition that 
noneconomic motives do not render Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable.
165
  
In holding Norris-LaGuarida applicable because this dispute deals with 
the employees’ obligation to provide labor the employer, the Court 
reasoned, “[t]he Act was enacted in response to federal-court intervention 
on behalf of employers through the use of injunctive powers against unions 
and other associations of employees.”166  As such, it was not Congress’s 
intent to pass Norris-LaGuardia in order to protect employers from having 
injunctions instituted against a lockout of employees.  Instead, Norris-
LaGuardia was passed to strengthen labor laws so that employees could 
unionize and not have to worry about courts striking down their organized 
actions. 
The New Negro Alliance opinion makes no mention of how Norris-
LaGuardia should be applied if the collective bargaining process has been 
abandoned,
167
 and thus the Court is not bound by any holding that 
unionized action is covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. New Negro 
Alliance does not recognize the process of collective bargaining, leaving 
open the dangerous possibility for all employment discrimination cases to 
come under federal law.
168
 
B.  The NFL Did Not Meet Its Burden of Demonstrating That It Would 
Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent a Stay 
Another objection to issuing a stay discussed in Judge Bye’s dissent is 
that the NFL owners did not meet the burden of proving that they would 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay.  Anyone interested in 
obtaining a stay has to “show a threat of irreparable harm.”169  An inability 
to show that irreparable harm is likely to occur is enough to warrant a 
denial of the motion to stay.
170
  In his dissent, Judge Bye clearly laid out 
the test for whether or not a stay should be granted.
171
  For a stay to be 
granted, the irreparable harm must threaten the very existence of the 
petitioner’s business,172 in this case the NFL itself. 
                                                                                                                          
165 Id. at 714. 
166 Id. at 715. 
167 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 800. See generally New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 552 (holding that 
non-economic protest is protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act). 
168 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 800 (citing Stearns v. NCR Corp., 297 F.3d 706, 710 (8th Cir. 2002), for 
the proposition that employment contracts between employers and non-union employees are generally 
governed by state law and not federal labor law). 
169 Rogers Grp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, Ark., 629 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 318 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
170 Id.  
171 See Brady III, 640 F.3d at 794–95 (Bye, J., dissenting) (stating that a party must show certain 
harm of an imminence as to require present equitable relief, that the harm must be actual and not 
theoretical, and that economic loss in itself does not constitute irreparable harm). 
172 Packard Elevator v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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The first argument the NFL made is that allowing the injunction to 
stand deprives the owners of their labor law right to lock the players out, 
which in turn would skew the collective bargaining process in favor of the 
players.
173
  As discussed earlier, the idea that the NFL has the labor law 
right to lock out the players is misplaced.  The players are not currently 
members of a union, having decertified it early in the process, and are thus 
not currently engaged in the process of collective bargaining.
174
  If the 
players no longer fall under the protection of federal labor law, then it 
follows that their employers, the owners, should be precluded from using 
federal labor laws against them.  In any case, the injury that the NFL 
claimed it will suffer is a loss of that bargaining power, but because there 
is no ongoing collective bargaining process, any claim that the owners will 
suffer irreparable harm due to loss of bargaining power is moot.
175
 
The NFL’s second argument that irreparable harm will occur absent a 
stay was that it will be impossible to go back to the status quo with respect 
to player movement if a stay were not granted.
176
  As the district court 
described it, the NFL’s argument centered on the idea that not staying the 
injunction would—after giving the players a leg up in the collective 
bargaining process—force the owners to give into demands for unrestricted 
free agency, thus exposing the NFL and its owners to antitrust challenges 
simply for trying to make their product desirable.
177
  The problem with this 
argument is that the court is not ordering the NFL to do anything that the 
owners say they would have to do absent a stay.  Nothing about the 
injunction makes anything court-mandated.  The district court opinion 
held, “[l]ike any defendant in any lawsuit, Defendants themselves must 
make a decision about how to proceed and accept the consequences of their 
decision.”178   
Although unrestricted free agency and the lack of a salary cap are two 
different practices, they are both sought by players as a means to higher 
pay.  They are also both resisted by owners, as both of those ideas shift the 
competitive balance in favor of the higher-spending, major-market teams.  
In 2010, the last season to operate without a salary cap, the two teams that 
played in the Super Bowl were the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Green Bay 
Packers, two small-market teams.
179
  It was not teams such as the New 
                                                                                                                          
173 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 795 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
174 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
175 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 795 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
176 Id. at 793. 
177 Brady II, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 (“[A]bsent a stay, its clubs’ possible agreements to common 
terms and conditions of player employment would expose the NFL and the member clubs to antitrust 
challenge for . . . respond[ing] to consumer demand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
178 Id. 
179 See Patrick Rishe, Fox Will Score Ratings Touchdown with Steelers-Packers Super Bowl, 
FORBES (Jan. 24, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/01/24/fox-will-
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York Jets, New York Giants, New England Patriots, or Dallas Cowboys.  
Thus, the argument that there would be irreparable harm to the League’s 
competitive balance absent a stay of the injunction (which would assume 
higher spending from the big-market teams) is immaterial.  Not only can 
the owners themselves decide how they want to proceed, meaning they do 
not have to support unrestricted free agency, but even if they did, the 
competitive balance of the League is not likely to shift any more than it 
does in a given year. 
The argument that there will be irreparable harm to the owners absent a 
stay pales in comparison to the much more substantial reality of the 
irreparable harm the players would suffer in the event of a stay if the 
injunction was granted.
180
  The most significant consequence of the stay is 
that it keeps players out of their team facilities.  As Judge Bye discussed in 
his dissent, even the briefest of stays would deprive the players of precious 
opportunities to “develop their skills . . . and to otherwise advance their 
NFL careers.”181  A prolonged lockout, the product of a “stay,” would 
prohibit the most vulnerable of the NFL’s employees, the rookies, from 
having any kind of opportunity.
182
  The owner-imposed stoppage leaves the 
rookies with no opportunity to practice with their team or access their 
team’s game plan and coaching staff, leaving them with even less of a 
chance than otherwise to make the team.
183
 
In addition, there are dangers of a stay for veteran players, who rely on 
being able to engage in certain activities at their team’s facility each 
offseason in order to maintain not only their level of play but also their 
viability.
184
  Long term, the inability to engage in a team’s offseason 
program could have major ramifications for veteran players and rookies 
alike.  Perhaps most importantly, the lasting effect cannot adequately be 
measured in monetary damages.  A lost season, which a lockout could very 
easily lead to, can be devastating in a sport where the average career length 
of a player is no more than five years.
185
  In such a competitive field, 
                                                                                                                          
score-ratings-touchdown-with-steelers-packers-super-bowl/ (referring to the Green Bay Packers and 
Pittsburgh Steelers as “members of small-market, blue-collar communities”). 
180 In order to intelligently analyze these events more closely, one has to take a step back and 
think of the consequences of the injunction being stayed.  A stay on the injunction allows the lockout to 
continue, thus precluding players from associating themselves in any way with their teams. 
181 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 796 (Bye, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 Id.  
183 Id.; see also Neeld v. Am. Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (“A young 
athlete’s skills diminish and sometimes are irretrievably lost unless he is given an opportunity to 
practice and refine such skills at a certain level of proficiency.”). 
184 See Brady III, 640 F.3d at 796 (Bye, J., dissenting) (listing valuable events including, but not 
limited to, classroom sessions, club evaluations, medical procedures, etc., that would be lost if the 
lockout was allowed to continue). 
185 The Average NFL Player, supra note 1 (stating that the average career span of NFL players is 
3.5 years). 
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players constantly have to prove their value, and the inability to prove that 
value for an entire season cannot be recaptured, not even by compensatory 
damages.
186
  Because no irreparable harm is likely to be experienced by 
owners, and because whatever harm they are likely to incur is clearly 
outweighed by the irreparable harm that could be suffered by the players, 
the NFL has a heavier burden to show that it is likely to prevail on the 
merits.
187
  As I have already demonstrated that the NFL’s argument that 
Norris-LaGuardia applies was unpersuasive,
188
 it is fair to say that the NFL 
did not sustain its burden. 
C.  The Public Interest Weighs in Favor of the Players 
Perhaps most widely important, the public interest as to whether or not 
a stay of the injunction should be granted weighs in favor of the players.  
Again, to assess the public interest, we need to take note of what a stay of 
the injunction would mean.  A stay of the injunction keeps the players out 
of their teams’ facilities and hurts their opportunities to gain employment 
in the future by cutting off an entire offseason of training.
189
  To gain an 
understanding of the public interest implications of a stay, we are forced to 
comprehend that allowing the lockout to stand forces apart the two sides 
even more, further hurting the chances that the two sides will reconcile and 
save the season.  The public interest becomes a factor when we realize the 
possibility of a lost season and analyze the implications it might have for 
non-parties, including stadium vendors, restaurant owners, and society in 
general. 
In his dissent, Judge Bye wrote, “At best, when considering the public 
interest in having a 2011 NFL season and, by extension, continuing with 
normal operations necessary for that objective, the public interest factor is 
a wash.”190  In Judge Bye’s view, the players should have won 
notwithstanding any public interest issue.  I question his judgment here, as 
I fear he does not fully understand what we mean by the “public interest.”  
What I fear most is that Judge Bye and the majority are thinking about 
public interest solely in terms of how the public will be affected by not 
having a 2011 NFL season, how much money is tied up in an NFL season, 
and how many people will lose their ability to earn a salary because their 
                                                                                                                          
186 Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (“[T]ime spent off the playing and practice fields diminishes 
players’ skills.  In the course of sitting out a season, this diminishment in skills could shorten or end the 
careers of some players.” (citations omitted)). 
187 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 796–97 (Bye, J., dissenting); see Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 
640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (“If the chance of irreparable injury to the movant should relief be 
denied is outweighed by the likely injury to other parties litigant should the injunction be granted, the 
moving party faces a heavy burden of demonstrating that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”). 
188 See supra Part IV.A. 
189 That reasoning is not public interest reasoning, and is more party-focused. 
190 Brady III, 640 F.3d at 800 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
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jobs depend on the NFL going about its daily business.   
While Judge Bye likely did not want to be swayed by sympathetic 
stories of stadium workers who will lose their jobs and neighborhood bar 
owners who will lose a major money-making business, the stories do 
reflect the people whose livelihoods depend on an NFL season.  Judge Bye 
is incorrect in saying that the public interest can be seen as a wash.  Not 
only are we talking about major losses for these employees who are non-
parties as the result of a season-long lockout, but there are also public legal 
interests that are at stake if the injunction is stayed.   
As the district court pointed out in its opinion, the NFL is lobbying that 
the public interest lies in encouraging collective bargaining between the 
two parties, and the imposition of a lockout under labor law is one way 
they are attempting to encourage that process.
191
  The problem with the 
NFL’s logic here is that the players have decertified the union and are no 
longer engaged in collective bargaining.
192
  The NFL’s opt-out of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement in May 2008 and subsequent failure to 
renegotiate should have hamstrung the League and restrained it from 
imposing a lockout under traditional labor laws.
193
  The public interest is in 
fact served best by not allowing the NFL to seek protection under labor 
law while the players are unable “to enjoy their corresponding rights of 
collective bargaining and the right to strike.”194  At its very core, it is a 
slippery slope argument.  We must not allow a group of employers to use 
labor laws to protect themselves when both the union has been disclaimed 
and the group of employees is not protected by labor laws themselves. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Labor law in general is about allowing less powerful groups of people 
to come together and engage in collective bargaining to protect themselves 
against more powerful employers.  The problems that arose between the 
NFL and its players in the early twenty-first century may have been fought 
over billions of dollars, where even the losers were making millions of 
dollars, but we cannot lose sight of the implications that laws have on all 
classes of society.  Those who make up the lower class, the janitors, the 
food service employees, and the maintenance workers who make $12,000 a 
year come under the same labor laws as NFL players who make upwards 
of $10,000,000 a year in many cases.  It is thus our duty to enforce labor 
laws and to respect the limits of labor law to ensure that all classes of 
                                                                                                                          
191 Brady II, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“[T]he NFL contends that the public interest in encouraging 
the collective bargaining process would be well-served by issuing a stay pending expedited appellate 
review.”). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
 1044 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1017 
workers are treated fairly.   
It might not have looked so bad from a public-relations standpoint to 
keep the players out of their facilities for an extended period of time, when 
in reality the NFL should not have successfully avoided the issuance of an 
injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but we have to imagine what it 
would have looked like to keep a lower class of workers out of their 
offices, to keep a lower class from earning enough to support their 
families.  We are not only talking about million dollar athletes.  The same 
laws that protect those athletes protect the workers who hold this country 
together.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed to deprive federal courts 
of the authority to stop those workers from picketing and attempting to 
improve their situations.  It was not passed as a tool for employers to hide 
behind.  The Eighth Circuit was wrong in granting the stay and vacating 
the injunction because it lost sight of the true meaning of labor law in this 
country: to protect those who cannot protect themselves. 
  
 
 
